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July 13, 1988

The broad outline of a START treaty is in place, along with much of the detail of the prospective agreement. The Defense Policy Panel of the House Armed Services Committee has been examining the implications of START for our national security. Some of the results are surprising.

For one thing, much more attention must be paid to the potential for Soviet breakout -- abrogating the treaty by suddenly turning up with more weapons than are permitted. Under START, we found, significant breakout could be achieved with weapons permitted or not counted under the treaty. This breakout potential is detailed in the first report of the panel on its START examination.

I've enclosed a copy. I hope you find it interesting.

Another report is in the works. It looks at the verification and force structure implications of START.

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100th Congress 2d Session

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BREAKOUT, VERIFICATION AND FORCE STRUCTURE: DEALING WITH THE FULL IMPLICATIONS OF START

REPORT

OF THE

DEFENSE POLICY PANEL

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDREDTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION



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